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Once upon a time, the indigenous peoples of Australia and New Zealand had
exclusive occupation and use of their homelands.  They did not distinguish
between land on dry soil and land under water – it was all considered to be
one garden.  In recent years, both peoples have attempted to use the courts
in their respective countries to reaffirm their connection with this landscape.
This article examines the contemporary interpretation of the common law
doctrine of native title and its applicability to one part of this space: land
under salt water.   
I  INTRODUCTION
In the 21st century, Australia and New Zealand have had to consider whether the
common law doctrine of native title is capable of recognising customary interests
in the foreshore and seabed that equate to ownership.  The Australian High Court
in a 2001 majority judgment, Commonwealth v Yarmirr (‘Yarmirr’),1 held that the
common law is incapable of recognising such interests.  In comparison, the New
Zealand Parliament in 2004 enacted legislation that assumed the common law
was capable of doing so.  The Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004 (NZ) (‘FSA’)
replaced the New Zealand High Court’s inherent jurisdiction with a statutory
jurisdiction to hear claims concerning ‘territorial customary rights’.2 These rights
are defined as a customary or aboriginal title that ‘could be recognised at
common law and that is founded on the exclusive use and occupation of a
particular area of the public foreshore and seabed by the group’.3 If the group is
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successful in proving a territorial customary right, they can apply to the High
Court to either refer the matter to the Attorney-General and the Minister of Maori
Affairs for a redress agreement to be negotiated, or order the establishment of a
foreshore and seabed reserve in which the Maori group will be recognised as the
guardians of the area.4
This article examines whether the FSA is correct in its assumption that the
common law could have recognised indigenous exclusive use and occupation of
the foreshore and seabed.  Essentially, the English-developed doctrine states that
upon a transfer of sovereignty, the property rights of the original inhabitants must
be fully respected.5 What this means for Australia and New Zealand in regard to
land under salt water is explored in this article.  The eminent law academic, Dr
Paul McHugh, with support from the Waitangi Tribunal, argues that the New
Zealand High Court’s inherent jurisdiction would not have allowed it to ‘deliver
exclusive ownership of the foreshore and seabed’.6 McHugh believes that if the
High Court had been given the opportunity to consider the issue unfettered by
statute, it would have adopted the Australian Yarmirr majority position.  McHugh
thus concludes that the FSA does more for Maori than the common law would
have done in that the Act simply presumes the common law was capable of
recognising exclusive ownership in land under salt water when in fact it was not
a possibility.
With respect, this article concludes differently.  It establishes that New Zealand’s
case law precedent indicates that the common law in New Zealand could have
recognised customary ownership of salt-water covered land.  It is argued that if
the Court had been given the opportunity to exercise its inherent jurisdiction then
it would have adopted, at the very least, a similar position to Kirby J’s dissenting
judgment in Yarmirr.  Justice Kirby’s position is that the common law is capable
of not recognising indigenous exclusive ownership, but rather qualified
ownership, of the foreshore and seabed.
The importance of this article lies in considering the significance of a major
divergence in the two countries’ understanding of the common law doctrine of
native title in land under salt water.  In one country, the courts currently allow no
argument as to indigenous ownership, and yet in another country it is a
prerequisite for possible redress.  That is, on one side of the Tasman Sea, the
courts, by majority, have decided that the common law is incapable of
recognising ownership; on the other side of the Tasman Sea, Parliament has
directed the courts to presume it is possible.  This article explores this difference
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and is particularly interested in considering whether the New Zealand Parliament
was correct to make such a presumption about the common law.  It considers the
significance Yarmirr could have had for New Zealand.  It concludes that the
current legal precedents of Yarmirr and the FSA require reconsideration.
II  AUSTRALIA’S CURRENT LEGAL ANSWER
The first Australian High Court decision to consider whether the common law
doctrine of native title is capable of recognising a customary interest in the
foreshore and seabed that equates to ownership was Yarmirr, decided in 2001.
Australian indigenous clan groups applied under the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth)
(‘Native Title Act’) for determination of native title in respect of the sea and
seabed in the Croker Island region of the Northern Territory.  Thus, the case
concerned not solely land under water, but the water itself and the right to the
resources in that water, i.e., fish.  The Court had to decide the issue under its
statutory jurisdiction of s 223(1) of the Native Title Act which states (emphasis
added):
The expression native title or native title rights and interests means the
communal, group or individual rights and interests of Aboriginal peoples or
Torres Strait Islanders in relation to land or waters, where:
the rights and interests are possessed under the traditional laws
acknowledged, and the traditional customs observed, by the Aboriginal
peoples or Torres Strait Islanders; and
the Aboriginal peoples or Torres Strait Islanders, by those laws and customs,
have a connection with the land or waters; and
the rights and interests are recognised by the common law of Australia.
It was a split decision.  Chief Justice Gleeson, Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ
(majority) held that there is a ‘fundamental difficulty standing in the way of the
claimants’ assertion of entitlement to exclusive rights of the kind claimed’.7
According to the majority, the common law public rights of navigation, fishing
and the right of innocent passage cannot stand alongside exclusive native title
rights and interests: ‘the inconsistency lies not just in the competing claims to
control who may enter the area but in the expression of that control by the
sovereign authority in a way that is antithetical to the continued existence of the
asserted exclusive rights’.8 The majority, in interpreting the three-pronged test of
s 223(1), accepted that the Native Title Act requires the two systems of law –
traditional law and common law – to operate together.  However, they claimed
that the continued recognition of traditional law is dependent on whether the two
laws can coexist.  They concluded that the starting point for a native title analysis
must therefore ‘begin by examining what are the sovereign rights and interests
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which were and are asserted over territorial sea’.9 In this case, those rights –
public rights to navigate and fish, and the international right to innocent passage
– trump traditional law because ‘[t]hese are rights which cannot co-exist with
rights to exclude from any part of the claimed area all others’.10
Nonetheless, the majority endorsed the lower Court’s finding that the claimants
are able to exercise non-exclusive native title rights and interests, in accordance
with and subject to their traditional laws and customs, to, for example fish, hunt
and gather for personal, domestic or non-commercial communal needs; access
the area to visit and protect places which are of cultural or spiritual importance,
and access the area to safeguard their cultural and spiritual knowledge.11 Hence,
the majority accepted what has been coined as a ‘bundle of rights’ – limited rights
to take and have access.
The two remaining High Court Justices dissented but for different reasons.
Justice Callinan believed that the majority went too far in recognising the
possibility of non-exclusive rights, stating there could be no native title at all in
the sea and seabed as it would be inconsistent with the Crown’s sovereignty.  Not
only could there be no exclusive native ownership or rights over the sea, there
could be no native title rights at all for there was ‘certainly no evidence in this
case as to any system of law with respect to, or regulation of’12 enforceable,
effective rules to regulate the use, access, and exploitation of the sea and seabed.
At the other end of the spectrum, Kirby J believed that the majority had not gone
far enough in recognising the possibility of exclusive ownership.  He held that the
common law doctrine of native title could, and should, recognise aboriginal
exclusive ownership of the sea and seabed but that public rights of navigation,
fishing and passage should qualify it.  In contrast to Callinan J, Kirby J accepted
that the aboriginal people had their own laws:
In the remote and sparsely inhabited north of Australia is a group of
Aboriginal Australians living according to their own traditions.  Within that
group … they observe their traditional laws and customs as their forebears
have done for untold centuries before Australia’s modern legal system arrived.
They have a ‘sea country’ and claim to possess it exclusively for the group.
They rely on, and extract, resources from the sea and accord particular areas
spiritual respect.  The sea is essential to their survival as a group.13
Justice Kirby emphasised that ‘[i]n earlier times, they could not fight off the
“white man” with his superior arms; but now the “white man’s” laws have
changed to give them, under certain conditions, the superior arms of legal







‘bundle of rights’ approach – qualified exclusivity:
They yield their rights in their ‘sea country’ to rights to navigation, in and
through the area, allowed under international and Australian law, and to
licensed fishing, allowed under statute.  But, otherwise, they assert a present
right under their own laws and customs, now protected by the ‘white man’s’
law, to insist on effective consultation and a power of veto over other fishing,
tourism, resource exploration and like activities within their sea country
because it is theirs and is now protected by Australian law.  If that right is
upheld, it will have obvious economic consequences for them to determine –
just as the rights of other Australians, in their title holdings, afford them
entitlements that they may exercise and exploit or withhold as they decide.15
Justice Kirby believed that this type of outcome was ‘precisely that for which
Mabo [No 2] was decided and the [Native Title] Act enacted.  The opinion to the
contrary is unduly narrow.  It should be reversed’.16 Kirby J observed that the
only limitations on recognition of native title rights and interests are those stated
in Mabo v Queensland (No 2) (‘Mabo’), ‘namely that native title could not be
recognised when to do so would “fracture a skeletal principle of our legal
system”; or where to do so would be repugnant to the rules of natural justice,
equity and good conscience’.17
In comparison to Kirby J, the majority in Yarmirr read Mabo quite differently.
Chief Justice Gleeson, Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ stated that the skeletal
metaphor could not be used
to obscure the underlying principles that are in issue.  There are obvious
dangers in attempting to argue from the several elements of the metaphor to
an understanding of the principles that lead to the result that is expressed by
the metaphor.  It is, therefore, not profitable to stay to consider what principles
of the legal system are, or are not, part of its ‘skeleton’.  Rather, attention must
be directed to the nature and extent of the inconsistency between the asserted
native title rights and interests and the relevant common law principles.18
Justice Kirby strongly disagreed with this reasoning, likening the majority
judgment to the pre-Mabo legal fictions.  For example, Kirby J exclaimed:
To press on with a blind adherence only to the adapted rules of the common
law of England is not only inconsistent with the essential legal foundation for
the step which this Court took in Mabo [No 2] as the basis for the new legal
reasoning concerning native title.  It is also incompatible with the
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independence and self-respect that should today be reflected in the exposition
by this Court of the common law of Australia, at least where that law is
concerned with vital and peculiar problems of a special Australian character.
The rights of the indigenous peoples of Australia are of that kind.19
Justice Kirby therefore approached his judgment in a very different manner to the
majority, not accepting that the common law necessarily trumps traditional law.
He forcefully argued:
In short, to take a view of the common law of Australia, including as it is
given recognition and protection under the Act, that would confine the native
title rights of indigenous peoples solely to those enjoyed by their forebears
before European settlement of Australia could itself amount to imposing on
them an unjust and discriminatory burden not imposed by the common law on
other Australians.20
Subsequent cases following Yarmirr have illustrated the context of the Yarmirr’s
majority ‘bundle of rights’ approach.  For example, in Lardil Peoples v
Queensland,21 the Federal Court of Australia held that the aboriginal claimants
had a right, in respect to the sea water and land, to: access it under their traditional
laws and customs; fish, hunt and gather living and plant resources from it for
domestic or non-commercial communal consumption in accordance with their
traditional laws and customs; take and consume fresh drinking water from the
fresh water springs in the inter-tidal zone in accordance with their traditional laws
and customs; and access in accordance with their traditional laws and customs for
religious or spiritual purposes.22
In Australia, s 223(1)(c) of the Native Title Act requires that native title rights and
interests be recognisable ‘by the common law of Australia’.  The precedent thus
set (albeit by majority opinion) is that the common law doctrine of native title is
not capable of recognising a customary interest in the foreshore and seabed, or in
seawater, that equates to ownership.  Instead, the common law doctrine of native
title in Australia recognises a ‘bundle of rights’ associated with saltwater masses.
The rights concern access and fishing for personal consumption.  Such rights
appear little different to the rights enjoyed by all Australians.
III  NEW ZEALAND’S CURRENT PRESUMPTION
In comparison, no New Zealand court has answered whether the common law
doctrine of native title is capable of recognising a customary interest in the
foreshore and seabed that equates to ownership.  In 2003, the New Zealand Court
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of Appeal, in its Attorney-General v Ngati Apa (‘Ngati Apa’)23 decision, was not
asked to answer this question.  Although Ngati Apa concerned land temporarily
and permanently under saltwater, the issue before the Court was whether the
Maori Land Court had jurisdiction under the Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993
(NZ) (also titled the Maori Land Act 1993 (NZ)) (‘TTWMA’) to determine the
status of the foreshore and seabed as Maori customary land – land held in
accordance with tikanga Maori (Maori customary values and practices).24
The Maori Land Court was established in the 1860s to issue fee simple titles to
land in customary ownership (thereby converting customary land to freehold
land).25 Today the Court continues to have jurisdiction to issue orders declaring
the status of land.  Hence, the Ngati Apa claimants, unlike the Yarmirr claimants
in Australia, had a choice of courts.  They could have pursued their claim of
ownership of the foreshore and seabed in the Maori Land Court or the High
Court.  In the Maori Land Court the argument would have been that the foreshore
and seabed is Maori customary land.  In the High Court the argument would have
been that the foreshore and seabed is land held by them under the common law
doctrine of native title.  They claimants decided to take the first option.
The case began in the Maori Land Court with an interim decision in favour of the
Maori claimants.26 On appeal, the Maori Appellate Court queried whether it had
jurisdiction to issue status orders in relation to land under salt water, and so stated
a case for the High Court to answer.27 The High Court answered no to this
question because the foreshore and seabed is Crown land.28 In contrast, the Court
of Appeal unanimously held yes; the Maori Land Court has jurisdiction to
investigate and determine, if the evidence warrants, whether the foreshore and
seabed is Maori customary land.  Thus, the decision was made in relation to the
Maori Land Court’s land status order jurisdiction, not the High Court’s inherent
common law native title jurisdiction.  However, as is explored in detail later in
this article, the justices deciding the Ngati Apa case did make numerous
comments relating to the common law doctrine of native title.  These comments,
it is argued, portray a clear insight into how a future court may have exercised its
inherent jurisdiction. 
Yet, of course, the FSA has since been enacted.  The High Court’s inherent
jurisdiction has been replaced by a statutory jurisdiction to hear claims
concerning ‘territorial customary rights’29 in the foreshore and seabed.  Section
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32(1) of the FSA defines these rights to mean: 
a customary title or an aboriginal title that could be recognised at common law
and that –
(a) is founded on the exclusive use and occupation of a particular area of the
public foreshore and seabed by the group; and
(b) entitled the group, until the commencement of this Part, to exclusive use
and occupation of that area.
Section 32(2) adds:
a group may be regarded as having had exclusive use and occupation of an
area of the public foreshore and seabed only if –
(a) that area was used and occupied, to the exclusion of all persons who did
not belong to the group, by members of the group without substantial
interruption in the period that commenced in 1840 and ended with the
commencement of this Part; and
(b) the group had continuous title to contiguous land.
Additionally, in assessing whether a group had exclusive use and occupation of
an area ‘no account may be taken of any spiritual or cultural association with the
area, unless that association is manifested in a physical activity or use related to
a natural or physical resource’.30 The exclusive use and occupation requirement
will still be met, however, even if the land was occupied or used by others, so
long as they were ‘expressly or impliedly permitted by members of the group to
occupy or use the area; and recognised the group’s authority to exclude from the
area any person who did not belong to the group’.31 So, New Zealand’s High
Court must now determine the rights of a Maori group in accordance with that
statutory test – a test which assumes that native title at common law could have
been founded on exclusive use and occupation of the foreshore and seabed.
This is a test that goes further than Australia’s s 223 of the Native Title Act.  At
first instance s 223 of the Native Title Act and 32(1) of the FSA are similar in that
they require the native title right or interest (in the Australian context, to land or
water; in the New Zealand context, to the public foreshore and seabed) to be
recognisable at common law.  But the similarity stops there.  The FSA adds, in a
manner that is absent in the Native Title Act, that the territorial customary right
being claimed must have been recognisable at common law and it is a right
founded on exclusive use and occupation.  Because the Act sets up this test as a
prerequisite for possible redress, it must have been Government’s intention that
at least some Maori groups could satisfy it.  If not, then territorial customary
rights are a cruel fiction.  It is this assumption then that the common law could
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have recognised exclusive use and occupation of land under salt water that is of
interest in this article.
Before turning to analyse this presumption, it is worthwhile stating that despite
the different approaches, the result is similar in New Zealand and Australia:
indigenous peoples cannot claim ownership in land under salt water.  Such land
is Crown land.32 All that a Maori group can hope for if successful in proving a
territorial customary rights claim is for a negotiated redress package
33
or the
establishment of a reserve which acknowledges their role of guardians of the
area.34 In order to attain rights more akin to the Australian indigenous peoples’
‘bundle of rights’, Maori can apply to the Maori Land Court for ‘customary rights
orders’.  In brief, in order to continue to practice customary activities, uses or
practices along the foreshore and seabed, Maori claimant groups must establish
that these rights: integral to tikanga Maori; have been carried out in accordance
with tikanga Maori in a substantially uninterrupted manner since 1840; continue
to be exercised in the same area of the foreshore and seabed; and are not
prohibited by any rule of law.35 As at the date of writing, no customary rights
orders have been issued.
IV  THE CRITIQUE OF NEW ZEALAND’S PRESUMPTION
The high profile academic position in New Zealand is that the majority in the
Australian Yarmirr case are correct.  Dr Paul McHugh, an internationally
renowned common law native title expert,36 along with the Waitangi Tribunal,
have been most prominent in arguing this position.  This part explains why
support for Yarmirr exists in New Zealand and why the presumption in the FSA
is thus said to do more for Maori than the common law would have in that it, on
McHugh’s analysis, incorrectly presumes the common law was capable of
recognising exclusive ownership in land under salt water when in fact the
common law could never have delivered this.
In January 2004, the Waitangi Tribunal heard, under urgency, the Government’s
response to the Court of Appeal’s Ngati Apa decision.37 Essentially, the Tribunal
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37 For the Govrnment’s plicy, se NwZaladtSuryfthFosSabd ramk(203)Bhive<://www.beehive.govt.nz/foreshore/summary.cfm> at 28July 06. For ediacvgeflwnthNgatiApdecison,s,eg, ‘LatoCirStufSbanr’OoDTms(unedi), 403,1.
had to consider whether the Government’s plan to introduce legislation to annul
the possibility provided for in Ngati Apa (for the Maori Land Court to hear a
Maori customary land status application in relation to the foreshore and seabed)
was in breach of the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi.38 The Tribunal agreed
with the Maori claimants that the Government’s policy was in breach of treaty
principles.  Part of the Tribunal’s considerations concerned the nature and extent
of the common law doctrine of native title.  Dr Paul McHugh was called as an
expert witness by the Crown, but emphasised at the hearing the independence of
his views.  He presented the most detailed evidence on this issue.  He adopted the
position that: New Zealand would be likely to follow the recent Australian cases
and base native title rights in the fact of continuity of customary property rights
upon the Crown’s acquisition of sovereignty;39 the foreshore and seabed is a
‘special juridical space’ over which the Crown’s sovereignty has a special
character;40 and:
at common law, the Crown’s sovereignty over the foreshore and seabed
amounts to a ‘bundle of rights’ less than full ownership; therefore, the
common law doctrine of aboriginal title, which has effect because of and at
the moment of acquisition of sovereignty, cannot recognise customary rights
that are greater than those of the sovereign.41
McHugh asserted that the Australian ‘continuity’ approach would be more
consistent with the Treaty of Waitangi (‘the Treaty’) than the Canadian ‘prior
occupation’ approach.42 He emphasised that in the Treaty of Waitangi, Maori
ceded kawanatanga (governorship) to the Crown in return for Crown protection
of Maori tino rangatiratanga (chieftainship) over their properties.43 He accepted
as correct the majority approach taken in the Australian High Court Yarmirr
decision.  He was not convinced by Justice Kirby’s dissenting judgment.44
McHugh relied on the Te Weehi v Regional Fisheries Officer (‘Te Weehi’)45 case
and the Crown-Maori fisheries settlement46 in support of his conclusion that the
‘bundle of rights’ analysis would apply in New Zealand.  He reasoned that the
fishing rights dealt with in New Zealand were regarded as ‘non-territorial’, thus
part of a bundle of customary rights, and therefore it would be inconsistent for a
different approach to be taken now whereby fishing rights could be regarded as
part of a hapu’s ‘qualified ownership’ of the foreshore and seabed.47 Although
McHugh opposed the High Court’s recognition of Maori customary rights
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amounting to ownership, he ‘acknowledged that there are ‘substantial Maori
rights over the foreshore and seabed’, and that some could be exclusive.48 In
other words, McHugh saw a split between title and rights whereby only rights
have the potential to be exclusive.
Claimant counsel at the Tribunal hearing, in their written submissions, challenged
McHugh’s position and the underlying conclusion of the majority decision in
Yarmirr.  One criticism was that the ‘bundle of rights’ approach was in effect a
‘semantic device’,49 and the Crown’s common law rights to the foreshore and
seabed ‘could equally be conceptualised as full ownership rights that are,
however, qualified by the public rights of navigation, fishing and innocent
passage’.50 The significance of this starting point would mean that the ‘nature of
the Crown’s sovereignty could not be raised as a bar to the common law’s
recognition of customary rights amounting to ownership of the foreshore and
seabed’.51 Another criticism was that the English common law has recognised a
wide range of rights in land under water, and in particular, in New Zealand, there
is Maori ownership of lakebeds coexisting with public rights to sail on and fish
in the lakes.52
The Crown endorsed McHugh’s position and the majority judgment in Yarmirr,
adding that ‘the common law doctrine of aboriginal title, which aims to “absorb
indigenous property rights in a colonial setting”, has a theoretical basis “distinct
from the rationalisation of marine property rights in England”’.53 In the words of
the Crown counsel:
The recognition of aboriginal title may only be so far as is consistent with
Crown sovereignty.  Reception tests relate to the importation of common law
rules which apply to those property rights after the assumption of sovereignty.
The scope of the recognition may indeed by very broad, but the nature of the
Crown’s sovereignty is a different question from which rules of common law
property enter a colony consequently.54
While the Waitangi Tribunal had difficulty with McHugh’s reasoning concerning
Te Weehi and the Crown-Maori fisheries settlement,55 on the essential point, the
Tribunal agreed with McHugh.  The Tribunal held that there is ‘an internal logic
to the “bundle of rights” position’56 because its logic is that ‘the law cannot
recognise for indigenous people what it does not recognise for the sovereign
power.  It is a variant of the legal maxim: you cannot give what you do not
have’.57 The Tribunal dismissed Kirby J’s judgment in Yarmirr because the
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‘statutory context for his argument is, however, significantly different from the
common law context in which the New Zealand High Court would be
operating’.58 The Tribunal concluded on this point: ‘we are of the view that it
would be a bold New Zealand High Court judge who would decline to follow the
approach of the majority in Yarmirr’.59 Accordingly, the Tribunal stated ‘we
consider it more likely that a “bundle of rights” approach would be adopted by
the High Court to conceptualise the nature of customary rights in the foreshore
and seabed’.60 This conclusion was reached even though the Tribunal earlier in
its discussion cautioned ‘no one – neither the Crown, claimants, nor this Tribunal
– can predict with certainty how the New Zealand High Court would respond to
applications to declare the existence, nature and holders of any customary rights
in foreshore and seabed areas’.61
The Government responded to the Tribunal report by introducing the Foreshore
and Seabed Bill 2004 (NZ).  It was sent to the Fisheries and Other-Sea Related
Legislation Select Committee in May 2004.  The Select Committee received
written and oral evidence from Dr Paul McHugh in September 2004 where he
argued, as he did before the Waitangi Tribunal, that the doctrine of native title
cannot recognise ownership in land under saltwater.  He stated that the inherent
jurisdiction could not deliver exclusive ownership of the foreshore and seabed
because ‘the common law could not recognise exclusive ownership of the
foreshore and seabed’.62 McHugh’s conclusion was based on the majority
judgment in Yarmirr.  He stated, in reference to that Australian case:
This approach can be seen as a balancing one that allows both an aboriginal
and public band of interest in the sea and seabed.  It is also consistent with the
High Court’s avowed approach since Wik where it emphasised the possibility
of the co-existence of aboriginal title and other property rights (private, or in
the case of the sea, public).  Here the aboriginal title rights in the seabed co-
existed with the public interest and the rights (such as fishery licences) carved
out from it.  In that sense the majority’s approach to recognition of aboriginal
title over the seabed in Yarmirr gave a principled compromise between
Callinan and Kirby.  It was the ‘bundle of rights’ approach towards which the
Waitangi Tribunal and I believed a New Zealand court would tend in exercise
of the inherent jurisdiction.63
The Select Committee was ‘unable to reach agreement’64 on whether the
Foreshore and Seabed Bill 2004 (NZ) should be passed and therefore reported it
back to the House with no amendments.  There was no consensus on whether the
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common law doctrine of native title was capable of recognising a customary
interest in the foreshore and seabed that equates to ownership.65
Thereafter the FSA was enacted creating an interesting division between the two
countries.  While both Australia and New Zealand conclude that the foreshore and
seabed is Crown land (they both reach the same endpoint), on this initial question
of whether the common law doctrine of native title is capable of recognising a
customary interest in the foreshore and seabed that equates to ownership,
Australia’s courts answer no; whereas New Zealand’s Parliament has treated it as
a live possibility.  The high profile academic response in New Zealand has been
that Australia’s majority Yarmirr decision is correct and that a similar position
would have been adopted in New Zealand by New Zealand’s judiciary but for the
FSA.  This article disputes that stance and argues that there are many indicators
in New Zealand’s case law to suggest that if the High Court had been given the
opportunity it might well have used its inherent jurisdiction to recognise
indigenous ownership of the foreshore and seabed.
V  THE POSSIBILITIES OF NEW ZEALAND’S COMMON LAW
A New Zealand’s Common Law
The first point is that the New Zealand Court of Appeal, in its Ngati Apa decision,
explicitly foresaw the possibility of the doctrine recognising exclusive
ownership.  The justices in writing the Ngati Apa decision did not address the
issue of the Maori Land Court’s jurisdiction in a vacuum devoid of the native title
doctrine jurisprudence.  For example, Elias CJ stated, ‘[a]ny property interest of
the Crown in land over which it acquired sovereignty therefore depends on any
pre-existing customary interest and its nature’,66 and ‘[t]he content of such
customary interest is a question of fact discoverable, if necessary, by evidence’.67
Chief Justice Elias explained, ‘[a]s a matter of custom the burden on the Crown’s
radical title might be limited to use or occupation rights held as a matter of
custom’,68 or, whilst quoting from the Privy Council decision Amodu Tijani v
Secretary, Southern Nigeria,69 they might ‘be so complete as to reduce any radical
right in the Sovereign to one which only extends to comparatively limited rights
of administrative interference’.70 Chief Justice Elias substantiated this possibility
with reference to Canada:
The Supreme Court of Canada has had occasion recently to consider the
content of customary property interests in that country.  It has recognised that,
according to the custom on which such rights are based, they may extend from
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usufructuary rights to exclusive ownership with incidents equivalent to those
recognised by fee simple title.71
The other four justices discussed the common law doctrine of native title in
similar terms.  For example, Tipping J began his judgment with the words
‘[w]hen the common law of England came to New Zealand its arrival did not
extinguish Maori customary title … title to it must be lawfully extinguished
before it can be regarded as ceasing to exist’.72 Justices Keith and Anderson, in a
joint judgment, emphasised ‘the onus of proving extinguishment lies on the
Crown and the necessary purpose must be clear and plain’.73 Moreover, Gault P
expressly recognised the uniqueness of New Zealand in the existence of the
common law jurisdiction of native title and the statutory jurisdiction of Maori
customary land status, and stated that he prefers to ‘reserve the question of
whether it is a real distinction insofar as each is directed to interests of land in the
nature of ownership’.74
No other New Zealand court has come as close as Ngati Apa in providing a hint
as to how the courts may have developed a common law precedent in relation to
the foreshore and seabed.  The discussion in Ngati Apa may have had resounding
effect but for the FSA.  In particular, the comments made in Ngati Apa poignantly
suggest a precedent that would be different to the majority decision in Yarmirr.
For example, Elias CJ stated:
The common law as received in New Zealand was modified by recognised
Maori customary property interests.  If any such custom is shown to give
interests in foreshore and seabed, there is no room for a contrary presumption
derived from English common law.  The common law of New Zealand is
different.75
While this reasoning does not establish that exclusive title would have been
recognised in New Zealand, it at least suggests a different approach to the
majority in Yarmirr.  Of the three positions postulated in Yarmirr (a ‘bundle of
rights’, no rights, and qualified exclusive title), Elias CJ’s reasoning reads most
like Kirby J’s dissenting position of qualified ownership.  Justice Kirby went to
great pains to stress the ‘special character’ of the common law of Australia,
emphasising that it is important not to ‘press on with a blind adherence only to
the adapted rules of the common law of England’.76 Australia’s independence and
self-respect should mean that the common law of Australia reflects the ‘vital and
peculiar problems of a special Australian character.  The rights of the indigenous
peoples of Australia are of that kind’.77
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The reasoning in the Ngati Apa decision suggests acceptance of the fact that, just
as Kirby J argued for in regard to Australia, the common law of New Zealand is
unique.  Chief Justice Elias stressed this reality:
In British territories with native populations, the introduced common law
adapted to reflect local custom, including property rights.  That approach was
applied in New Zealand in 1840.  The laws of England were applied in New
Zealand only ‘so far as applicable to the circumstances thereof’ … from the
beginning the common law of New Zealand as applied in the Courts differed
from the common law of England because it reflected local circumstances.78
By reading the Ngati Apa decision closely, it is hard to fathom why it has been
argued that it would have taken a ‘bold’79 New Zealand court to approach the
issue of indigenous ownership of the foreshore and seabed in a fashion similar to
Kirby J.  An examination of Gault P’s judgment in Ngati Apa, for example,
suggests that he did not accept the argument that indigenous ownership would per
se be inconsistent with the coastal marine management extolled in the Resource
Management Act 1991 (NZ), for ‘those provisions are not wholly inconsistent
with some private ownership’.80 If given the chance, Gault P may well have
reached a ‘qualified exclusive ownership’ decision in a like manner to Kirby J.
The joint judgment of Keith and Anderson JJ definitely hinted at this possibility:
‘[s]ubject to such qualifications arising from the circumstances of New Zealand,
property in sea areas could be held by individuals and would in general be subject
to public rights such as rights of navigation’.81 Keith and Anderson JJ, in contrast
to the majority in Yarmirr, accept that New Zealand’s common law has allowed
for individual ownership ‘under the law of England which became part of the law
of New Zealand in 1840 “so far as applicable to the circumstances of New
Zealand”, private individuals could have property in sea areas including the
seabed’.82 Moreover, Elias CJ expressly rejects the argument that the different
qualities in land under water compared to dry land should make private property
interests in the foreshore and seabed unthinkable because of the public interest in
navigation and recreation.  Her Honour agrees with Keith and Anderson’s JJ
review that ‘interests in the soil below low water mark were known under the
laws of England’ and ‘it is difficult to understand why an entirely different
property regime would necessarily apply on the one hand to the pipi bank … and
on the other to the hapuka grounds … or reefs’.83
It is therefore argued in this article that there was enough in Ngati Apa to suggest
that New Zealand would not have followed Australia on this issue of whether the
common law doctrine of native title was capable of recognising indigenous
ownership of land under salt water.  The reasoning in Ngati Apa consistently
stressed the uniqueness of New Zealand, including a history of recognising Maori
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ownership of land.  The reasoning was not premised on a ‘skeletal principle’ or
an inconsistency examination as occurred in the majority judgment in Yarmirr.  In
essence, Ngati Apa reads very differently from the majority Yarmirr decision.
The justices in Ngati Apa stressed the importance of extinguishment stemming
from clear and plain legislation.  The warning in Ngati Apa that there may be no
remaining customary land in the foreshore and seabed emphasises this point –
that is, ownership existed but may not remain because of subsequent
developments such as the Treaty of Waitangi (Fisheries Claims) Settlement Act
1992 (NZ).84 In other words, the rights may have been extinguished not because
of some inconsistency or inability of two laws to co-exist, but because of a
legislative inquiry.
B  New Zealand’s Unique Characteristics
The second point which was correctly recognised and emphasised in Ngati Apa
is that two characteristics distinguish New Zealand as unique: the Treaty of
Waitangi and Maori land legislation.  The Treaty of Waitangi was a document
signed between the British Crown and Maori chiefs in 1840.  It recognised that
Maori owned the land in New Zealand.  The second article guarantees to Maori
‘their lands, villages and all their treasures’,85 or, as the English version reads,
‘full exclusive and undisturbed possession of their Lands and Estates Forests
Fisheries and other properties which they may collectively or individually
possess so long as it is their wish and desire to retain the same in their
possession’.86 The second article then states the Crown has the exclusive right of
pre-emption ‘over such lands as the proprietors thereof may be disposed to
alienate at such prices as may be agreed upon’.87
The Treaty of Waitangi thus endorsed the position at common law that a change
in sovereignty does not extinguish indigenous peoples’ property rights, and
specifically, Maori remain the proprietors until they wish to sell to the Crown.
Even the English version of the Treaty endorses the position that Maori owned
not only the dry land, but also the ‘fisheries’ and ‘other properties’ as stated in the
text.  This was consistent with the Maori worldview, which saw no distinction
between land below and above high tide.  It was all considered one country, one
garden, with, for example, root vegetables and berries in one patch, shellfish and
fish in another patch.
The early courts agreed that the Treaty endorsed the common law.  In R v
Symonds (‘Symonds’),88 a case decided seven years after the signing of the Treaty
of Waitangi in 1847,  Chapman J stated:
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it cannot be too solemnly asserted that [native title] is entitled to be respected,
that it cannot be extinguished (at least in time so of peace) otherwise than by
the free consent of the Native occupiers.  But for their protection, and for the
sake of humanity, the government is bound to maintain, and the Courts to
assert, the Queen’s exclusive right to extinguish it.  It follows … that in
solemnly guaranteeing the Native title, and in securing what is called the
Queen’s pre-emptive right, the Treaty of Waitangi … does not assert either in
doctrine or in practice any thing new and unsettled.89
The later courts were not as supportive of the Treaty.  In particular, the now
infamous Wi Parata v Bishop of Wellington (‘Wi Parata’)90 case, decided in 1877,
marked the emergence of a different precedent to Symonds.  It labelled the Treaty
a ‘simple nullity’,91 based on the reasoning that ‘[n]o body politic existed capable
of making cession of sovereignty’92 because Maori were ‘primitive barbarians’.93
Later the Privy Council held that rights conferred by the Treaty could not be
enforced in the courts except in so far as a statutory recognition of the rights can
be found.94 Nonetheless, the legal, political and social revival of the Treaty in the
1970s has meant that it has played a cornerstone role in the contemporary
emergence of the common law doctrine of native title.  The New Zealand Court
of Appeal, in 1987, specifically stated that the Treaty could no longer be treated
as a ‘dead letter’95 and to do so ‘would be unhappily and unacceptably
reminiscent of an attitude, now past’.96 Moreover, in the 1990s, the then President
of the Court of Appeal, Cooke P, stated that the Treaty ‘is simply the most
important document in New Zealand’s history’,97 and similarly, Lord Woolf of the
Privy Council stated that the Treaty ‘is of the greatest constitutional importance
to New Zealand’.98
In the landmark case to re-introduce the doctrine of native title into New Zealand,
Te Weehi, decided in 1986, the High Court held that a Maori person has a right to
take undersized shellfish, or paua, in contravention of the law, on the basis that
he was exercising a customary right which the law had not extinguished.  Justice
Williamson found in favour of Te Weehi, recognising that the establishment of
British sovereignty had not set aside the local laws and property rights of Maori,99
thus concluding that because there had been no plain and clear legislative
extinguishment of the fishing right the right continues to exist: ‘[i]t is a right
limited to the Ngai Tahu tribe and its authorised relatives for personal food
supply.’100 In reaching this decision, Williamson J recognised the significance of
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the Treaty of Waitangi for New Zealand: ‘obviously the rights which were to be
protected by it arose by the traditional possession and use enjoyed by Maori tribes
prior to 1840’.101
In Te Runanganui o Te Ika Whenua Inc Society v Attorney-General (‘Te
Runanganui o Te Ika Whenua’)102 the Court of Appeal, in 1994, concluded that
neither under the common law doctrine of native title, nor under the Treaty of
Waitangi, do Maori have a right to generate electricity by the use of
waterpower.103 But in discussing the doctrine, and accepting its existence in New
Zealand (although not to the extent of electricity generation), Cooke P agreed that
the Treaty guaranteed to Maori, subject to British kawanatanga (government),
their tino rangatiratanga (cheiftainship) and their taonga (tangible and intangible
treasures) and ‘[i]n doing so the treaty must have been intended to preserve for
them effectively the Maori customary title’.104
Moreover, Ngati Apa recognised the unique nature of the common law doctrine
of native title in New Zealand in regard to the Treaty of Waitangi.  The Court did
not divorce the discussion of the common law from the Treaty of Waitangi.  The
justices ensured a circle back to the 1847 Symonds decision, stating similarly to
Chapman J in Symonds that Maori customary land ‘is not the creation of the
Treaty of Waitangi or of statute, although it was confirmed by both’.105 In doing
so, the Court of Appeal accepted that the Treaty of Waitangi reflected the
common law: a change in sovereignty does not extinguish indigenous peoples’
property rights, and Maori remain the proprietors until they wish to sell to the
Crown.
In a like manner to the Treaty of Waitangi, the impact of the Maori land
legislation would not have been ignored by a court coming to grips with
understanding what the common law doctrine of native title could have meant for
New Zealand’s foreshore and seabed.  The now named Maori Land Court, then
named the Native Land Court, was established in the 1860s under statute
following the Crown’s waiver of its right of pre-emption, which had been
guaranteed to Maori in the Treaty of Waitangi.  Although the Court’s empowering
statute, the Native Land Act 1865 (NZ), still recognised Maori proprietary
customs and ownership of land in New Zealand,106 it allowed for Maori to convert
their land into a freehold title – Maori freehold land – and then alienate it (sell,
gift, mortgage and so on) as they so desired.
But ten years after the establishment of the Maori Land Court, Prendergast CJ, in
Wi Parata, stated:
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On the cession of territory by one civilised power to another, the rights of
private property are invariably respected, and the old law of the country is
administered, to such extent as may be necessary, by the Courts of the new
sovereign. … But in the case of primitive barbarians, the supreme executive
Government must acquit itself, as best it may, of its obligation to respect
native proprietary rights, and of necessity must be the sole arbiter of its own
justice.  Its acts in this particular cannot be examined or called in question by
any tribunal, because there exist no known principles whereon a regular
adjudication can be based.107
At the turn of the century, the Privy Council, hearing an appeal from New
Zealand in Nireaha Tamaki v Baker,108 retaliated and said the reasoning in Wi
Parata ‘goes too far, and that it is rather late in the day for such an argument to
be addressed to a New Zealand Court’.109 Their Lordships recognised that New
Zealand’s legislation refers to Maori customary law and therefore:
It is the duty of the Courts to interpret the statute which plainly assumes the
existence of a tenure of land under custom and usage which is either known to
lawyers or discoverable by them by evidence. … one is rather at a loss to know
what is meant by such expressions ‘native title’, ‘native lands’, ‘owners’, and
‘proprietors’, or the careful provision against sale of Crown lands until the native
title has been extinguished, if there be no such title cognisable by the law, and no
title therefore to be extinguished.110
Even though the Privy Council condemned Wi Parata, believing that the
existence of customary title was affirmed in statutes, New Zealand’s judiciary
continued to adhere to the Wi Parata reasoning.  For example, In Re the Ninety
Mile Beach,111 decided in 1963, New Zealand’s Court of Appeal held that all
foreshore in New Zealand, which lies between the high and low water marks and
in respect of which contiguous landward title has been investigated by the Maori
Land Court, was land in which Maori customary property had been extinguished.
It was because of this case that the issue of whether the Maori Land Court had
jurisdiction to determine the status of foreshore and seabed land came before the
Court of Appeal in Ngati Apa.
While Te Weehi, in 1986, reintroduced the doctrine, it did so in regard to native
fishing rights, not title.  Williamson J did not feel bound by the earlier Wi Parata
case law, distinguishing those cases from the one he was hearing on the right to
take undersized paua because it was a ‘non-territorial’ claim; this case was ‘not
based upon ownership of land or upon an exclusive right to a foreshore or bank
of a river’.112 It was important for Williamson J to emphasise this aspect
otherwise he would have been bound by higher court precedent (namely the
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Court of Appeal’s In re the Ninety-Mile Beach decision).  It was Ngati Apa, a case
concerning land (rather than rights to resources such as fish) that conclusively put
to an end the Wi Parata ‘barbarian theory’, overruled In re the Ninety-Mile
Beach, and held that the Maori Land Court has jurisdiction to determine whether
the foreshore and seabed has the status of customary land.  Therefore, the
Waitangi Tribunal was correct to have had difficulty with McHugh’s use of Te
Weehi.113 Rather than Te Weehi lending support for a ‘bundle of rights’ approach
in New Zealand, Williamson J had to emphasis the non-territorial nature of the
claim so as to distinguish rights to paua from rights to land.
Moreover, if a court had been given the opportunity to consider whether the
common law was capable of recognising Maori ownership of the foreshore and
seabed, Maori land legislation would not have been ignored in the reasoning.
Since 1993, Te Ture Whenua Maori Act, in its preamble, explicitly reaffirms that
the Treaty of Waitangi guaranteed to Maori protection of rangatiratanga, and
recognises that ‘land is a taonga tuku iho of special significance to Maori
people’.114 The Act is premised on promoting the retention of ‘that land in the
hands of its owners, their whanau, and their hapu’.115 Bearing this in mind, the
Treaty of Waitangi and Maori land legislation raise at least a semblance of a
suggestion that New Zealand’s legal history is different to Australia.  Thus a New
Zealand court would have approached the issue of indigenous ownership of land
under salt water differently to the majority in Yarmirr.
C New Zealand’s Judicial Approach
The third point is that it has not been the approach of New Zealand’s courts to
singularly emphasise the Australian case law.  Emphasis has rather been on
Canada, and to some extent, on Mabo.  Williamson J, in Te Weehi, alleged
‘Canadian Courts have consistently taken the view that customary rights of
aboriginal peoples must be preserved and that charters and treaties similar to the
Treaty of Waitangi recognise obligations which arise as a result of those
customary rights’.116 He stated that the ‘Canadian cases follow the general
approach that customary rights of native or aboriginal peoples may not be
extinguished except by way of specific legislation that clearly and plainly takes
away [that] right’.117 He endorsed that view, stating that in New Zealand if
customary rights have not been extinguished, they are preserved.118
In Te Runanga o Muriwhenua Inc v Attorney-General (‘Te Runanga o
Muriwhenua’),119 Cooke P made extensive reference to the Canadian case law,
What Could Have Been?  The Common Law Doctrine of Native Title in
Land Under Salt Water in Australia & Aotearoa/New Zealand 135
113 See above n 55 and accompanying text for the Waitangi Tribunal’s reasoning.  See also above n
55 and accompanying text for McHugh’s arguments.
114 The expression ‘taonga tuku iho’ is not defined in TTWMA, but essentially it is an expression
meaning that land is the absolute treasure.
115 TTWMA preamble.  See also ss 2, 17.
116 Te Weehi [1986] 1 NZLR 680, 691.
117 Ibid.  For example, some of the Canadian cases cited included: Calder v A-G of British Columbia
(1973) 34 DLR (3d) 145; Guerin v R (1984) 13 DLR (4th) 321.
118 Ibid 692.
119 [1990] 2 NZLR 641 (‘Te Runanga o Muriwhenua’).
describing it as ‘[a]lthough more advanced than our own … [which] is still
evolving’,120 likely to provide ‘major guidance’121 for New Zealand.  He added
that New Zealand’s courts should give just as much respect to the rights of New
Zealand’s indigenous peoples as the Canadian Courts give to their indigenous
peoples.122 Cooke P saw no reason to distinguish the Canadian jurisprudence on
the basis of constitutional differences and emphasised the analogous approaches
to the partnership and fiduciary obligations being developed in Canada under the
doctrine of native title and in New Zealand under the Treaty of Waitangi.  This
comparison enabled Cooke P to confidently conclude that ‘[i]n principle the
extinction of customary title to land does not automatically mean the extinction
of fishing rights’.123
In Te Runanganui o Te Ika Whenua, Cooke P referred to the Canadian case law,
and Mabo, in devising the nature of native title.  He explained the doctrine as:
On the acquisition of the territory, whether by settlement, cession or
annexation, the colonising power acquires a radical or underlying title which
goes with sovereignty.  Where the colonising power has been the United
Kingdom, that title vests in the Crown.  But, at least in the absence of special
circumstances displacing the principle, the radical title is subject to the
existing native rights.124
President Cooke elaborated on the nature of native title rights stating that: they
are usually communal; they cannot be extinguished (at least in times of peace)
otherwise than by the free consent of the native occupiers; they can only be
transferred to the Crown while the transfer must be in strict compliance with the
provisions of any relevant statutes; it is likely to be in breach of fiduciary duty if
an extinguishment occurs by less than fair conduct or on less than fair terms; and
if extinguishment is deemed necessary, then free consent may have to yield to
compulsory acquisition for recognised specific public purposes (but upon
extinguishment proper compensation must be paid).125 President Cooke then
explained the scope of native title in terms of a spectrum:
The nature and incidents of aboriginal title are matters of fact dependent on
the evidence in any particular case. … At one extreme they may be treated as
approaching the full rights of proprietorship of an estate in fee recognised at
common law.  At the other extreme they may be treated as at best a mere
permissive and apparently arbitrarily revocable occupancy.126
With Te Runanganui o Te Ika Whenua being decided two years after the
Australian High Court decision Mabo, Cooke P stated that on the extent of the
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jurisdiction of the courts the very full discussion in Mabo ‘would require close
study’.127 But he added ‘[o]f course nothing said in that case is binding on a New
Zealand Court.  In New Zealand we would have to be guided by our conception
of the strength of the competing arguments and any others relevant to this
country’s circumstances’.128
In McRitchie v Taranaki Fish and Game Council (‘McRitchie’)129 Richardson P,
for the majority, discussed the doctrine using the then leading Canadian and
Australian cases – R v Sparrow130 and Mabo – for support that native rights ‘are
highly fact specific’.131 He explained the test as 
The existence of a right is determined by considering whether the
particular tradition or custom claimed to be an aboriginal rights was rooted
in the aboriginal culture of the particular people in question and the nature
and incidents of the right must be ascertained as a matter of fact.132
Interestingly, Thomas J, in dissent, who had found in favour of a Maori
customary right to fish for introduced species, based his decision entirely on New
Zealand law; no reference was made to overseas decisions.
In Ngati Apa, there is extensive reliance on Canadian case law, and the Australian
case Mabo.  No post-Mabo Australian case is cited, including Yarmirr.  The
justices cite with approval the New Zealand cases: Te Weehi, Te Runanga o
Muriwhenua, and Te Runanganui o Te Ika Whenua.  Justices Keith and Anderson
even emphasise the reference made in Te Runanga o Muriwhenua that it is ‘right
for New Zealand Courts to lean against any inference that in this democracy the
rights of the Maori people are less respected than the rights of aboriginal peoples
are in North America’.133 The reasoning in Ngati Apa suggests a strong preference
for a New Zealand answer, with perhaps some guidance from Canada and Mabo,
but nothing post-Mabo even enters the Ngati Apa justices’ radar, and arguably
correctly so.
New Zealand’s judicial approach has consistently emphasised the requirement for
clear and plain legislative intent for extinguishment of native title to be effective.
Unlike in Australia, there is no hint of an emerging precedent in New Zealand that
where an inconsistency may exist in terms of use of the land, the native title will
be extinguished.
Turning to the significance of the Yarmirr decision for New Zealand, if a New
Zealand court had been given the opportunity to consider the extent of indigenous
property rights in the foreshore and seabed, Yarmirr would have been considered
to be of, at most, persuasive authority.  It is argued here that Yarmirr would have
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been distinguished.  The strongest indication for this position is the reasoning in
Ngati Apa, and New Zealand’s legal history, including a legal history of
recognising exclusive ownership in land under freshwater.  It is doubtful that the
New Zealand courts would have introduced the notion that land under salt water
constituted a special juridical space.  Chief Justice Elias recognised this in Ngati
Apa, observing that it would be difficult to understand why entirely different
property regimes would apply in one area and not another.134 Moreover, the
inconsistency doctrine emphasised by the majority in Yarmirr was developed in
a context of an inconsistency between native title and public rights to navigate,
fish and secure innocent passage, whereby those rights mostly relate to the sea
water, not the seabed or foreshore.  When the Yarmirr Court spoke of a special
juridical space, it was considering a native title claim to the seawater and the
seabed.  In New Zealand, the issue would have focused primarily on Maori
interests in the land – the foreshore and seabed – for most rights to resources in
seawater have been settled in New Zealand under legislation.135 A native title
right in the seabed may not conjure the same special juridical space as seawater,
for the public rights to fish and travel over and in the water do not necessarily
impact on the land.  For example, ownership of the seabed would give ownership
to that land space, not necessarily to the water above.  A right to land, anchor, or
cross the seabed and foreshore might be at issue, or a right to take resources
embedded in the seabed and foreshore.  But there is a solution just as Kirby J
recognised: qualified exclusive ownership.  The Ngati Apa justices were not
hostile to this approach.136 Additionally, Maori have certainly not stated that if
they had been granted native title in the foreshore and seabed that they would
have denied public access.137 Also, there are New Zealand precedents of awarding
title in land under water to Maori – lakebeds – and that legislation clearly states
that ownership of a lake bed does not confer ownership, management, or control
of waters, aquatic life, or structures attached to or in the bed of the lake.138 A
similar precedent could have been applied to the foreshore and seabed.
In regard to the Waitangi Tribunal’s comments that it would have taken a ‘bold’
Court to depart from the approach of the majority in Yarmirr, no court is bound
by the Tribunal’s opinions.  While the courts have maintained that the Tribunal’s
opinions ‘are of great value to the Court’,139 and ‘are entitled to considerable
weight’,140 the courts are free to dismiss such statements.  As the Court of Appeal
has asserted: ‘[t]he crucial point is that the Waitangi Tribunal is not a Court and
has no jurisdiction to determine issues of law or fact conclusively’.141 Moreover,
the Tribunal’s foreshore and seabed report was the outcome of an urgent inquiry
138 Monash University Law Review (Vol 32, No 1 ‘06)
134 Ngati Apa [2003] 3 NZLR 643, 660.  See above n 83 and accompanying text.
135 See, eg, Maori Fisheries Act 2004 (NZ).
136 See, eg, above n 81 and accompanying text.
137 The Waitangi Tribunal emphasised this fact: see Waitangi Tribunal, Report on the Crown’s
Foreshore and Seabed Policy, above n 6.
138 See, eg, Ngai Tahu Claims Settlement Act 1998 (NZ) s 171.  See also above n 52.
139 New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-General [1987] 1 NZLR 641, 662.
140 Moana Te Aira Te Uri Karaka Te Waero v The Minister of Conservation and Auckland City
Council (HC, Auckland, M360-SW01, 19 February 2002, Harrison J) [59].
141 Te Runanga o Muriwhenua Inc v A-G [1990] 2 NZLR 641 at 651 (Cooke P).
– it had limited time to hear the claim and write the report: ‘we have had four
weeks in which to produce the report’.142 Significantly, the Tribunal stressed
‘[u]nfortunately, at the Tribunal’s hearing, claimant counsel did not take the
opportunity to cross-examine Dr McHugh, preferring to treat his evidence as if it
was a legal submission to be responded to by their own submissions’.143
The Tribunal’s observations could have been rebutted.  The Tribunal premised its
support for the position that it would have taken a bold court to recognise
indigenous ownership in salt covered land because of the maxim ‘the law cannot
recognise for indigenous peoples what it does not recognise for the sovereign
power’.  But this is only true if it is agreed that the starting point is as the majority
in Yarmirr saw it: what are the sovereign’s rights and interests in the territorial
sea?  But the reasoning in Ngati Apa suggests a different approach: ‘[t]he proper
starting point is not with assumptions about the nature of property … but with the
facts as to native property’.144 Ngati Apa stressed, first, ‘the entire country was
owned by Maori according to their customs and that until sold land continued to
belong to them’145 and, second, the ‘common law of New Zealand is different’146
to the English common law.  Applying Ngati Apa, the Waitangi Tribunal’s maxim
may not have significantly influenced a court considering this issue.  Besides, the
Tribunal itself had qualified its opinion with the observation that no one can
predict with certainty how the High Court could have applied the common law
doctrine of native title to the foreshore and seabed.
This article has therefore identified considerable disparity on whether New
Zealand’s common law is capable of recognising indigenous ownership of land
either temporarily or permanently under salt water.  While others have held that
it would have required a ‘bold’ New Zealand court to depart from the majority
reasoning in Yarmirr, it is argued here that Ngati Apa had already positioned itself
as the ‘brave’ court to hint at an affirmative answer.  Even though the statements
in Ngati Apa relating to the common law’s ability to recognise private ownership
could have been dismissed as obiter dicta (the decision the court made related to
the Maori Land Court’s jurisdiction, not the common law), the observations
single out this case as perhaps willing to disturb ‘the current political and
economic power structure’147 in a way that courts in other jurisdictions have failed
to do.  It was a brave decision that has provided much insight into the common
law doctrine of native title in New Zealand.
Instead of approaching the issue as Yarmirr setting the precedent, in reality, in
New Zealand, it would have required a ‘bold’ court to dismiss New Zealand’s
unique legal history and case law.  A future, ‘audacious’ New Zealand court
would have followed the approach in Ngati Apa, not Yarmirr.
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VI  WHERE TO FROM HERE?
A Australia
Any attempt by indigenous Australians to exercise ownership of the foreshore
and seabed is fettered by a conservative High Court that has, arguably, applied a
common law test that is too restrictive.  They are stuck with the Yarmirr precedent
until a braver composition of the Australian High Court emerges.  As Maureen
Tehan has observed, ‘[a]s the common law of native title lies dormant, waiting
for the common law to revive and reinvigorate it as a set of fuller rights, the
promise and process of change and the search for a fair and just relationship will
continue’.148
However, as Mabo has taught, precedent can be overruled.  Applying Mabo
reasoning to Yarmirr, a future Court may well overrule the Yarmirr precedent.
First, as is stated in Mabo, the common law can be modified to bring it into
conformity with contemporary notions of justice and human rights, so long as the
departure does not fracture a skeleton of principle upon which the common law
is based: ‘no case can command unquestioning adherence if the rule it expresses
seriously offends the values of justice and human rights (especially equality
before the law) which are aspirations of the contemporary Australian legal
system’.149 Second, the old precedent, as espoused for example in Cooper v
Stuart,150 a Privy Council decision on appeal from Australia decided in 1889,
stating that Australia was ‘practically unoccupied, without settled inhabitants or
settled law’,151 is today, according to Mabo, ‘false in fact and unacceptable in our
society’.152 It was a theory that depended on ‘a discriminatory denigration of
indigenous inhabitants’.153 A similar comment in the future could be made about
Yarmirr.  Third, ‘a mere change in sovereignty does not extinguish native title to
land’.154 Justice Brennan concluded that the ‘common law of this country
[Australia] would perpetrate injustice if it were to continue to embrace the
enlarged notion of terra nullius’,155 and therefore ‘it is right to say that their native
title is effective as against the State of Queensland and as against the whole world
unless the State, in valid exercise of its legislative or executive power,
extinguishes the title’.156 By treating the salt water and salt water covered land as
a special juridical space, deeming it the property of the Crown upon acquisition
of sovereignty, means that Yarmirr could be subjected to reasoning like that of
Brennan J in the future: Yarmirr could be overruled in a similar manner as
Cooper.  Although Kirby J alerted the Court to this in his reasoning in Yarmirr, it
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will be for a future High Court bench to consider the significance of the majority
Yarmirr decision.
There is some academic support within Australia for the position that the majority
judgment in Yarmirr is an incorrect interpretation of the common law.  For
example, Noel Pearson argues that the High Court, post Mabo (and Wik Peoples
v Queensland157), has it wrong.  He has identified three recent decisions, including
Yarmirr, and concluded that ‘the High Court has misinterpreted the definition of
native title under the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) and fundamentally misapplied
the common law’.158 Pearson argues that the Court’s entire discussion of native
title is treated as an exercise in statutory interpretation rather than an articulation
of the common law, and in doing this the Court has devised a test that is contrary
to how the Court, in Mabo, first envisaged the doctrine and how courts overseas
(in particular, the Supreme Court of Canada in its 1997 Delgamuukw v British
Columbia159 decision), have interpreted the doctrine.  He disputes the current test,
which focuses on proof of traditional laws and customs, and argues that the more
subtle and correct way to answer what continues after the change of sovereignty
is ‘entitlement to occupy the land … not the incidents of rights and interests that
are established by reference to arcane traditional laws and customs’.160 He
substantiates this approach by reference to what Toohey J said in Mabo: ‘[i]t is
presence amounting to occupancy which is the foundation of the title and which
attracts protection, and it is that which must be proved to establish title … Thus
traditional title is rooted in physical presence’.161 Pearson concludes that the
recent High Court justices have ‘proceeded with their assumption without
grappling with the host of Canadian authorities which emphasise occupation at
the time of sovereignty as the foundation of native title’.162
In reference to the recent High Court approach, Maureen Tehan similarly argues
‘[t]en years of the Native Title Act has seen the common law of native title
emerge, blossom, change and wilt’.163 She reflects: ‘[t]he promise engendered by
Mabo has failed to materialise in the form of a robust and enforceable native title.
To that extent, the sun may have set, with native title fatally wounded by the
Native Title Act and the High Court’.164
Richard Bartlett also takes issue with the recent High Court approach, arguing in
a similar vein to Pearson that ‘the requirement of continuous acknowledgement
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and observance of traditional laws and customs is unwarranted in principle and a
denial of equality’.165
Sean Brennan, while not specifically referring to the Yarmirr decision, also
critiques the High Court’s recent approach stating that since 1992 the pendulum
‘appears to have swung back against indigenous interests most dramatically’.
166
Brennan questions the Court’s emphasis on the spiritual character of native title
over the secular, economic and pragmatic aspects of indigenous connection to
land; the development of relatively harsh common law rules for extinguishment;
and, the drawing of tight boundaries around the concepts of tradition, connection
and recognition.167 Brennan concluded that the Court’s recent approach has put at
stake the human rights of Australian indigenous peoples.
Professor Kent McNeil from Canada, a world leading authority on the common
law doctrine of native title, has recently claimed that Australian (and Canadian)
case law, including the often celebrated Mabo (and Delgamuukw v British
Columbia168) cases, have ignored the native title extinguishment issue.  McNeil
has claimed that the cases fail to tell the whole story, for lurking behind the
decisions ‘are other explanations that relate more to political stability and
economic priorities than to legal principle and precedent’.169 He has asserted:
Regardless of the strengths of legal arguments in favour of Indigenous
peoples, there are limits to how far the courts in Australia and Canada are
willing to go to correct the injustices caused by colonialism and
dispossession.  Despite what judges may say about maintaining legal
principle, at the end of the day what really seems to determine the outcome in
these kinds of cases is the extent to which Indigenous rights can be reconciled
with the history of British settlement without disturbing the current political
and economic power structure.170
McNeil’s observation and the Australian academics’ positions together suggest
real concern with how the Australian courts are interpreting and applying the
doctrine of native title.
B  New Zealand
In comparison, any attempt by the indigenous New Zealanders to exercise
ownership of the foreshore and seabed is fettered by the FSA until a braver
composition of Members of Parliament agree that the Act needs amending.  This
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scenario seems very unlikely: the Government has the public majority’s support
on how it handled the foreshore and seabed controversy.171
Nonetheless, the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination (‘CERD’) has put the New Zealand Government on notice.  The
Committee issued a decision in March 2005 stating it is concerned ‘at the
apparent haste’172 with which the FSA was enacted, and that ‘insufficient
consideration may have been given to alternative responses to the Ngati Apa
decision which might have accommodated Maori rights within a framework more
acceptable to both the Maori and all other New Zealanders’.173 Of interest to this
article, CERD concluded that the Act appears ‘on balance, to contain
discriminatory aspects against the Maori, in particular in its extinguishment of
the possibility of establishing Maori customary title over the foreshore and
seabed and its failure to provide a guaranteed right of redress’.174 CERD has
requested New Zealand’s Government to ‘monitor closely the implementation of
the Foreshore and Seabed Act … and to take steps to minimize any negative
effects, especially by way of a flexible application of the legislation’.175 Still, it
does not appear that CERD’s criticism will be enough to convince those in
Parliament that the FSA requires amending.176
In the meantime, in order for the High Court to accept a territorial customary
rights claim, it must accept that it was possible for the common law to recognise
exclusive use and occupation of the foreshore and seabed by Maori groups.  The
FSA poses this presumption as a prerequisite for possible redress or guardianship
opportunities.  Even though this stance is at odds with the current Australian
position (Yarmirr)177 and a leading native title expert’s opinion (Dr Paul
McHugh),178 it has been argued here that the presumption is correctly reflective of
New Zealand’s common law.  There is enough evidence in New Zealand case law
to conclude that it would have been possible for a High Court to accept, in
accordance with its inherent jurisdiction, that the common law could have
recognised Maori exclusive use and occupation of the foreshore and seabed.  It is
highly likely that if it had been given the chance, New Zealand’s High Court
would have reached this conclusion.  The obiter comments in Ngati Apa suggest
this.179 Furthermore, other recent New Zealand native title cases support this.180
At the very least, the existence of the Treaty of Waitangi, the Maori Land Court,
and a history of recognising Maori ownership of land under fresh water would
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have ensured a very different approach to that taken by the majority in Yarmirr.
Therefore, the FSA does not do more for Maori than the common law.  It is not
incorrect for the Act to assume that the common law was capable of recognising
exclusive ownership in land under salt water.  If it had been given the chance,
New Zealand’s High Court would have held it possible.  To conclude otherwise
would be a misconception of New Zealand’s law.
V  CONCLUSION
Prior to British sovereignty, indigenous Australians and New Zealanders had
property rights in land under water.  They did not distinguish between land on dry
soil and land under water – it was all considered to be one place.  For example,
in regard to Maori, the landscape was described as one garden – ‘the kumara (root
vegetable) bed here, the pipi (shellfish) bed there’ – without division between dry
and wet land.181 Indigenous Australians had a similar worldview as Kirby J
recognised in his Yarmirr decision: ‘[o]f communities such as theirs it has been
truly said that they do not observe this cultural distinction between land and sea,
constructing land and sea property into a seamless web of cultural landscape’.182
Today, the reality is that wet salt land can be exclusively occupied in both
countries.  It is a sought after space, especially valuable for its marine farms and
large scale commercial ports.  In recent years the law has been used to guarantee
that this landscape is in Crown ownership.  In Australia, the instrument has been
the courts; in New Zealand, the instrument has been legislation.  Even though
both countries answer differently on the point of whether the common law
doctrine of native title is capable of recognising indigenous ownership of the
foreshore and seabed, because both countries reach the same end result (Crown
ownership), the initial difference is negligible.  Both countries need to revisit this
issue, for the first footsteps into the 21st century have left serious questions about
the operation of the common law doctrine of native title.  In particular, the recent
interpretations have left many in both countries wishfully thinking ‘what could
have been?’.
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